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We examine incentives for network-specific investment and the implications for network 
governance. We model an environment in which participants making payments over a 
network can invest in a technology that reduces the marginal cost of using the network. A 
network effect results in multiple equilibria; either all agents invest and use of the 
network is high or no agents invest and use of the network is low. The high-use 
equilibrium can be implemented where commitment is feasible. Where commitment is 
infeasible, fixed costs associated with use of the network-specific technology result in a 
hold-up problem that implements the low-investment equilibrium.  As a result, 
governance structures necessary to achieve commitment will be preferred to those 
necessary merely to achieve coordination. For example, mutual ownership by network 
users may emerge where users face risks of ex post renegotiation. Such a governance 
structure will also be sufficient to avoid the network effect. 
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  “[I]f the [Bank of America] controlled the management of the new
partnership, it would be doomed to fail. The new organization
would have no heart, no spirit, because the new member-owners
would not have the same motivation to make the new venture a
success. ... [A] new BankAmericard organization, with many more
banks participating as member-owners, would expand the card
market way beyond anything the Bank of America could imag-
ine.”1
1 Introduction
A demand externality is the feature typically highlighted in the analysis of net-
work resources. If use of a network by one participant increases the valuation
of network services to others, equilibrium utilization of network assets may
remain below the social optimum. Where network utilization is enhanced by
some speciﬁc investment, however, the network eﬀect may be only one factor
depressing network usage. A more conventional hold-up problem may obtain
in the absence of commitment. For example, optimal pricing of network usage
can prevent network-speciﬁc investments that would reduce the marginal cost
of using a network.
Underinvestment in network-speciﬁc assets can be mitigated through adop-
tion of an appropriate governance structure. In environments where a network
can commit to prices, underinvestment implies a proﬁtable opportunity for a
coordinator that can overcome the network eﬀect. Coordination will not be
suﬃcient to achieve full investment absent commitment. In such a case, sub-
optimal investment implies value for governance mechanism that can achieve
commitment and thus prevent the hold-up problem.
The case of Visa is illustrative.2 Bank Americard, the earliest predecessor
to the present day Visa card, exhibited characteristics of a network unable
to commit to prices. It could be viewed as a network because more users of
1Chutkow (2001) p. 106.
2Cardillo, Martin, and Orlando (2004) discuss the Visa case in more detail.
1the card represented greater potential value to merchants accepting it. And
the more merchants that would accept the card, the greater was the value to
potential users. Bank Americard could also be viewed as unable to commit to
prices when it began in 1958. At that time, the product was under exclusive
ownership by Bank of America, who was seeking nationwide distribution of
their product in the nascent market for revolving credit and payments. More-
over, many potentially proﬁtable expenditures by card-issuing banks would be
speciﬁc to the network.
Bank of America established Bank Americard Service Corporation in 1966
in order to expand the program outside the state of California.3 The corpo-
ration would license banks outside the state to issue the Bank Americard in
their regions. Formation of the service corporation was the ﬁrst step toward
avoiding commitment problems inherent in the market at that time. This
progression culminated in 1970 with Bank of America’s decision to transfer
ownership of the Bank Americard program to licensed issuers of the card.4
National Bank Americard Incorporated, jointly owned by card-issuing banks,
is thus an illustration of a governance structure that emerges for its superior
capability to achieve commitment.
The literature on network eﬀects is well established. Initial contributions
highlight the demand interdependence that is essential to network environ-
ments. Farrell and Saloner (1985) show conditions under which an indus-
try can become ‘trapped’ in an inferior or obsolete standard. And Katz and
Shapiro (1985) show that network demand externalities give rise to multiple
equilibria.
Models of two-sided markets provide a more general framework that is par-
ticularly well suited to examining pricing on payments networks. Two-sided
markets are networks that face demand from two diﬀerent types of network
3Mandell (1990) p. 31.
4Chutkow (2001) p. 109.
2participants. Demand from one side creates an externality for the other. Ro-
chet and Tirole (2003), Schiﬀ (2003), and Wright (2004), among others, show
that the network may charge diﬀerent prices to diﬀerent sides of the market in
order to balance network utilization. Evans and Schmalensee (2005) highlight
the importance of diﬀerent prices for solving the “chicken-and-egg” problem
typical to payments networks.5
These contributions have been careful to account for pricing implications
of market power inherent in network environments. The power associated
with speciﬁc investments by network participants is not addressed. However,
Holmstrom (1982) showed that investment characterized by incomplete con-
tractabilty and interdependent returns is subject to ex post renegotiation.
This risk of ex-post renegotiation can “hold-up” investment. Consequently,
Williamson (1985), Klein (1988), and Hart (1995) conclude hold-up provides
incentives for integration of interdependent production activities. In practice,
however, many ﬁnancial services remain independent of underlying payments
networks.
This paper develops a model that highlights the interrelation of the dis-
incentive to invest in cost-reducing innovation resulting from a network eﬀect
and that derivative of a more conventional hold-up problem. Assuming net-
work access is priced at marginal cost, we show a network eﬀect may result in
multiple investment equilibria. However, coordination can avoid investment
disincentives associated with the network problem if the network can com-
mit to particular prices for network usage. In contrast, where commitment is
not feasible, ﬁxed costs of using the network-speciﬁc technology will result in
hold-up of network-speciﬁc investment.
Table 1 summarizes the results of the paper. For each of the cases con-
sidered, we compare equilibrium allocations with those achieved by a central
5“Consumers do not want cards that merchants do not take, and merchants do not want
cards that consumers do not have.” p. xi.
3planner. We show that in equilibrium there can be too little investment as
well as, interestingly, too much investment. Finally, we provide conditions such
that socially-inferior equilibria are not implemented when network utilization
is priced a marginal cost.
Table 1: Summary of Results
Ability to Cost structure Price cap Elasticity of
commit to of on demand for
network usage Investment network-speciﬁc network network Investment
prices decision technology usage usage equilibrium
possible decentralized variable no any value low &
& ﬁxed high
” coordinated ” ” ” high
not decentralized ” ” ” low
possible
” coordinated ” ” ” ”
” ” variable only ” ” high
” ” ” limit for elastic high
payments
received
” ” ” ” inelastic low
The analysis rationalizes emergent forms of network governance as mech-
anisms necessary to achieve commitment and thereby avoid hold-up of prof-
itable investment. For example, where the cost of contracting between network
users is suﬃciently low, commitment may be achieve through joint ownership
of network resources. Such governance arrangements cannot be rationalized
as mechanisms necessary to internalize a network externality through coordi-
nation. These ﬁndings should be of interest to researchers and policy makers
4concerned with under-utilization of network resources.
The next section speciﬁes the environment and derives the solution to the
planner’s problem. Section 3 presents an analysis of network-speciﬁc invest-
ment assuming it is possible for the network operator to commit to usage fees.
Section 4 examines participant investment assuming commitment is not pos-
sible. We describe a payments network throughout the analysis for ease of
exposition and because such a discussion provides the most obvious mapping
to the empirical cases discussed in section 5. Nevertheless, these results apply
to network environments in general.
2 The environment
The economy is populated by a mass 1 of network participants.6 Each net-
work participant makes, on behalf of clients, one payment to and receives
one payment from each of the other network participants. The total revenue
received by the network participant for this activity is a given constant R.7
Consequently, participants desire to minimize the cost of their activity.
A fraction θ of the payments each participant must make are assumed to
be time-sensitive or ‘urgent.’ The remaining share of payments are assumed
to be non-time-sensitive or ‘trivial.’ The cost of making urgent payments
oﬀ-network is ¯ ϕ. The oﬀ-network cost of trivial payments is ϕ < ¯ ϕ. We
also assume participants must pay costs ϕ and ¯ ϕ to receive trivial and urgent
payments, respectively, oﬀ-network.
6For pedagogical reasons, it may be useful to imagine the participants arranged around
a circle of unit perimeter. However, this geometry plays no role in our model.
7For example, participants may be local monopoly providers of banking services. As local
monopoly providers, participants’ retail pricing decisions would be determined by relative
demand for products rather than the relative cost of producing these various services. Con-
sequently, we assume that the price charged to clients is independent of whether payments
are ultimately sent or received on- or oﬀ-network. Although the price charged could depend
on whether payments are urgent or trivial, analysis of optimal pricing at the retail level
would be disjoint from the investment problem that is the focus of this analysis.
5The cost of making and receiving payments on-network does not depend
upon whether the payment is urgent or trivial. Participants must pay ps + δ
for each payment sent and pr +δ for each payment received over the network.
δ may be thought of as the participant resource cost of ‘hooking up’ to the
network whereas ps and pr are usage fees set by the network owner. The
marginal cost of network usage to the network owner is zero.8
The magnitude of the hook-up cost depends on whether an investment has
been made in a network-speciﬁc technology. If no investment has been made,
we assume δ = ¯ δ where ϕ < ¯ δ < ¯ ϕ. If participants choose to invest in the
technology, they pay γ and reduce the cost of hooking up to zero. Hence,
participants who have paid γ must pay only ps for payments sent and pr for
payments received. Table 2 provides a summary of costs incurred for sending
and receiving payments.
Table 2: Cost of Payments
Trivial Urgent
(1 − θ) (θ)
Oﬀ-network ϕ ¯ ϕ
On-network w/out investment ps,r + ¯ δ ps,r + ¯ δ
On-network w/investment ps,r ps,r
To ﬁx ideas, consider a particular analog in which inter-bank payments
can be either transferred over an electronic network or in the form of a check
through the mail. Sending and receiving payments by mail would result in the
relatively low administrative cost of maintaining a mail room. Because the
mail is slow, urgent payments transferred oﬀ-network would require a premium,
perhaps for the cost of an armored courier. Since on-network payments are
relatively fast and secure, there is no diﬀerence in cost between urgent and
8The fact that there is a cost for both receiving and making payments is common in the
literature on two-sided markets (see, for example, Rochet and Tirole 2004). It is implicitly
assumed that the Coase theorem does not hold, either because of private information, or
transactions cost and regulatory constrains, or both.
6trivial payments. The costs incurred when payments are transferred in this
way correspond to both the network usage fees and the expense of ensuring the
accuracy of each transaction. Alternatively, banks could invest in computer
systems to automate coordination and veriﬁcation of accurate funds transfers
across accounts. In this case, on-network costs would be limited to the fees
paid for network usage.
2.1 The planner’s problem
To establish a benchmark allocation, consider the problem for a planner who
must decide whether to invest in the technology. We assume the planner cares
only about payments being made and thus wants to minimize the total cost of
this activity. As assumed above, the marginal cost of network usage is zero.
The cost of the technology is γ per participant. Hence the total cost for the
mass 1 of participants is γ. The beneﬁt from investing in the technology is
that all payments issued and received on-network have no cost.
The cost if the planner invests is
C
i = γ. (1)
If the planner does not invest, the cost is
C
o = 2[θ¯ δ + (1 − θ)ϕ] (2)
as the mass 1 of agents send and receive their urgent share (θ) of payments
on-network at hook-up cost (¯ δ) while they send and receive their trivial share
(1−θ) of payments oﬀ-network at the relevant cost (ϕ). Investment is chosen
whenever Ci ≤ Co. The following proposition summarizes this result.
7Proposition 1 A planner will invest in the technology whenever γ ≤ 2[θ¯ δ +
(1 − θ)ϕ].
3 The commitment case
In this section we consider a network able to commit to prices for network
usage. Contingent on these prices, participants choose whether or not to invest
in the network-speciﬁc technology. Finally, participants choose their mix of
on- and oﬀ-network payments.
Given the ability to commit to usage fees, the network owner always prefers
to set a low marginal price for sending and receiving payments. A ﬁxed fee
can then be used to extract resources from the network participants in a lump
sum fashion.9 Consequently, we can begin the analysis by assuming marginal
prices ps = pr = 0. With such prices, participants who have not invested in the
technology choose to send their urgent payments on-network and their trivial
payments oﬀ-network. Participants who have invested in the technology send
all payments on-network.
The remainder of the section shows that multiple equilibria can arise be-
cause of a network eﬀect. Indeed, participants will invest in the network-
speciﬁc technology if suﬃciently many other participants do and will not if
suﬃciently few do. This multiplicity implies value to giving participants the
incentive to invest in the technology regardless of other participants’ invest-
ment decisions.
3.1 Decentralized investment
Let λ denote the fraction of participants that invest in the technology. The
proﬁts for a cost-minimizing network participant are πo if the participant does
not invest and πi if it does. These proﬁts depend on whether or not other
9Such a fee can be thought of as a reduction of R.
8participants have invested in the technology.
π
o = R − (θ¯ δ + (1 − θ)ϕ) − λ¯ δ − (1 − λ)(θ¯ δ + (1 − θ)ϕ), (3)
π
i = R − γ − (1 − λ)(1 − θ)ϕ. (4)
Since ¯ δ < ¯ ϕ, every participant chooses to send urgent payments on-network.
Since ϕ < ¯ δ, participants who have not invested in the technology send trivial
payments oﬀ-network.
Equation (3) indicates participants who have not made the investment pay
¯ δ for the urgent share θ of payments they make on-network and ϕ for the
trivial share of payments they make oﬀ-network. All payments received from
the fraction λ of participants who have made the investment come on-network
at a price ¯ δ. The cost of payments received from participants who have not
made the investment depends upon their urgency. The urgent share of these
payments are received on-network at price ¯ δ while the remainder are received
oﬀ-network at price ϕ.
Equation (4) is interpreted similarly. Since the investment has been made,
all payments sent go on-network at no charge. All payments received through
the network also come at no charge. However, trivial payments (fraction 1−θ)
received from participants who have not made the investment (fraction 1−λ)
result in oﬀ-network charges (price ϕ).
Participants choose to invest in the technology if πi ≥ πo, which is true if
and only if
γ ≤ 2θ¯ δ + (1 − θ)(ϕ + λ¯ δ). (5)
By investing in the technology, participants incur a cost γ. On the other
hand, they save ¯ δ on the urgent share of payments θ both sent and received
9on-network. In addition, they save ϕ on the trivial share of payments (1 − θ)
sent oﬀ-network. Finally, they save ¯ δ on the trivial share of payments received
on-network from other investing participants (fraction λ). The only marginal
cost a participant cannot avoid by investing is ϕ paid for oﬀ-network receipts
of trivial payments from non-investing participants.
Clearly, if γ ≤ 2θ¯ δ+(1−θ)ϕ then participants will invest in the technology
regardless of what other participants do. Similarly, if γ ≥ 2θ¯ δ +(1−θ)(ϕ+ ¯ δ)
participants will not invest regardless of what others do. Parameters in these
ranges yield unique equilibria. However, if
2θ¯ δ + (1 − θ)ϕ ≤ γ ≤ 2θ¯ δ + (1 − θ)(ϕ + ¯ δ) (6)
then there are multiple equilibria corresponding to λ values of 0, 1, and λ
′,
where λ
′ solves γ = 2θ¯ δ + (1 − θ)(ϕ + λ
′¯ δ).
We can deﬁne a notion of stability of these equilibria with respect to small
deviations of network participants’ beliefs about λ. We say that an equilibrium
λ is unstable if an arbitrarily small deviation from the beliefs necessary to
sustain this equilibrium gives rise to a diﬀerent equilibrium. Let η ∈ [0,1]
denote the probability with which a participant invests in the technology if
that agent believes that a mass λη of participants invest in the technology.
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium λ is unstable if, ∀ε > 0, |λη − λ| > ε ⇒ η  = λ.
It is obvious that λ
′ is not stable. If γ ≥ 2θ¯ δ + (1 − θ)ϕ a low-investment
equilibrium is stable. Alternatively, if γ ≤ 2θ¯ δ+(1−θ)(ϕ+¯ δ) a high-investment
equilibrium is also stable. Hence, for all values of γ between these two bounds,
both the low-investment and the high-investment equilibrium are stable.
103.2 Coordinated investment
In this section, we show an opportunity for coordination exists. Multiple
equilibria arise with decentralized investment because participants must pay
a ﬁxed cost up front, while the beneﬁts that they obtain from the technology
will depend on other participants’ behavior. Instead, if it is possible to pay,
at least partly, for the technology as a variable cost depending on usage, then
we can show that the equilibrium with high investment will be unique.
We assume the existence of a ‘coordinator,’ either a third party or an
entity working for the network owners.10 The coordinator can invest in the
technology on behalf of network participants and charge them some variable
cost. The coordinator is assumed to face a production function with constant
returns to scale; i.e., it must pay a cost γ for each participant. By doing this,
we focus on the highest-cost case for the coordinator. Below we discuss the
case where the investment represents a cost-reducing innovation in network
usage. In such an event where investments are duplicative, complete property
rights allow the innovator to obtain non-negative proﬁts by implementing the
high-investment equilibrium.
After the network owner has announced prices ps and pr, the coordinator
announces prices it charges network participants on behalf of whom it has
invested in the technology. These prices are qs per payment sent, qr per
10It is possible to endogenize the role of the coordinator by assuming that several poten-
tial coordinators compete for the market. In the case of a CRS technology, as is studied
in this section, this amounts to assuming potential coordinators are endowed with diﬀerent
aptitudes for developing the organizational and contracting technology needed for coordi-
nation. If we assume that the realization of ﬁrm-speciﬁc innovative capabilities is common
knowledge, the coordination game would be preceded by a preliminary winner-take-all stage
and only the most capable coordinator would enter the market for this service. In the case
of an IRS technology, which is discussed in section 3.4, the most eﬃcient coordinator would
underprice others. Such a result would obtain if potential innovators are deﬁned as in Klep-
per (1996), who emphasizes diﬀerences in ﬁrm-speciﬁc innovative capabilities. Alternatively,
the network owner can be assumed to provide coordinating services.
11payment received, and a ﬁxed fee f.11 Subsequently, network participants
choose how to send their payments.
Let λc denote the fraction of network participants that have invested through
the coordinator. Assuming variable prices are suﬃciently low to ensure par-
ticipants will prefer to send and receive all payments over the network, a
break-even ﬁxed fee is identiﬁed for the coordination service provider. These
prices are then shown to provide incentives for participants to access the tech-
nology via the coordinator. Finally, these prices are shown to be feasible when
parameters fall in the range of multiple equilibria identiﬁed in condition (6).









r + (1 − λ)θq
r] (7)
where λ ≥ λc is the total share of participants with access to the network-
speciﬁc technology through either the coordinator or their own investment.
The coordinator incurs cost of investment (γ) and revenues in proportion to
the share of participants installing the technology via the coordinator. Every
network-participating client pays the ﬁxed fee f. Assuming qs ≤ ϕ, client
participants will prefer to send even trivial payments over the network. As-
suming qr ≤ ¯ δ assures client-participants will prefer to receive on-network
payments through the network-speciﬁc technology.12 The coordinator receives
qr for payments received by clients from all users of the technology who make
all payments on-network. Finally, the coordinator also receives qr from clients
11We do not restrict qs, qr or f to be strictly positive.
12If the coordinator can costlessly monitor network participants in order to prevent them
from unhooking the technology, then it is possible to charge qr high enough such that the
ﬁxed fee f can be set equal to zero. However, if qr > ¯ δ and monitoring is costly, participants
may have an incentive to ‘unhook’ the technology when they are not sending payments and
save qr − ¯ δ on payments received.
12for urgent payments received from non-users of the technology. If a high-
investment equilibrium exists, the break-even condition for the coordinator
whenever λ = 1 is
f = γ − q
s − q
r. (8)
If πc are the proﬁts of a participant with access to the cost-reducing tech-
nology by way of the coordinator, then
π
c = R − f − q
s − λq
r − (1 − λ)(θq
r + (1 − θ)ϕ). (9)
Participants will choose the technology through the coordinator if πc ≥ πo,
which is true if and only if
f + q
s + λq
r + (1 − λ)θq
r ≤ 2θ¯ δ + (1 − θ)(ϕ + λ¯ δ). (10)
If the coordinator chooses qs = ϕ and qr = ¯ δ, then participants will choose
the technology through the coordinator if and only if
f ≤ θ(¯ δ − ϕ). (11)
The total cost of the technology to participants is then
f + q
s + q
r ≤ (1 + θ)¯ δ + (1 − θ)ϕ. (12)
Participants will adopt the technology through the coordinator rather than
through their own investment if πc ≥ πi, which is true if and only if
13f + q
s + λq
r + (1 − λ)θq
r ≤ γ. (13)
Given qs = ϕ and qr = ¯ δ, πc ≥ πi provides incentives for all participants to
choose the coordinator over own investment and λ = 1 if and only if
f ≤ γ − ϕ − ¯ δ. (14)
That is, f + qs + qr ≤ γ assures prices are incentive compatible for all partic-
ipants to obtain the technology through the coordinator rather than through
own investment. Rearranging the right hand side of (12) to 2θ¯ δ+(1−θ)(ϕ+¯ δ),
it is obvious that if parameters are in the range of multiple equilibria speciﬁed
by condition (6), then the total cost to participants when prices are chosen
to assure πc ≥ πi is less than the total cost when prices are chosen to as-
sure πc ≥ πo. And these prices satisfy the coordinator break-even condition
speciﬁed in equation (8).
We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If γ ≤ 2θ¯ δ+(1−θ)(ϕ+¯ δ), then the coordinator can implement
the equilibrium with investment uniquely.
3.3 Comparison to the planner’s allocation
Contrasting the participant investment rules with network pricing commitment
to that of the central planner presented in Proposition 1 yields Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 There can be too little investment as well as too much invest-
ment in this economy.
Proof. Suppose 2θ¯ δ+(1−θ)ϕ ≤ γ < 2[θ¯ δ+(1−θ)ϕ]. Then the planner would
choose to invest in the technology but the decentralized equilibrium with no
14investment could occur. In this case, investment would be below the social
optimum. Conversely, suppose 2[θ¯ δ+(1−θ)ϕ] < γ ≤ 2θ¯ δ+(1−θ)(ϕ+¯ δ). Then
the planner would choose not to invest in the technology but the decentralized,
high-investment equilibrium could occur. In this case, investment would be
above the social optimum.
Figure 1 illustrates the correspondence between the decentralized λ equi-
libria and the central planner’s allocation in the γ parameter space. The
remainder of the analysis disregards the unstable equilibria. Instead we fo-
cus exclusively on the two equilibria where either all participants invest or no
participant invests.










The deviation of the private from the social allocation results from an
externality associated with charges for receipts. Under decentralized decision
15making, potential investors do not consider the costs imposed on payment
recipients. Consequently, if γ is suﬃciently large but participants expect others
to invest in the technology there can be too much investment. In this case,
it can be individually rational for a participant to invest even if it would
have been socially optimal for all participants not to invest. Conversely, too
little investment occurs if γ is suﬃciently small but participants expect others
not to invest in the technology. In this case, it can be individually rational
for a participant not to invest even though it would be socially optimal for
all participants to do so. The central planner solves this collective action
problem by considering only the extreme cases where all participants invest or
no participants invest.13
As ϕ → 0, the range of parameters for which there can be underinvestment
shrinks to a single point. Since payments oﬀ-network are nearly costless, there
is little scope for the central planner to save costs by coordinating investors to
make payments on-network. In this case, the main concern is that the high-
investment equilibrium might occur. As ϕ → ¯ δ, the range of parameters for
which there can be overinvestment shrinks to a single point. Since the cost of
sending payments oﬀ-network is almost as high as sending them on network,
there is little scope for the central planner to save costs by coordinating in-
13The collective action problem becomes obvious if we consider the special case where the
fraction of urgent payments becomes vanishingly small; i.e. θ → 0. Assuming the cost of
investment is smaller than the cost of trivial oﬀ-network payments, i.e. γ < ϕ, the marginal
participant would certainly invest. This action would be justiﬁed on charges for initiated
payments, regardless of the mode of receipts that result from other participant investment
decisions. If ϕ < γ < 2ϕ, the central planner would prefer all participants to invest since
the total cost of doing so is less than the total cost of sending all now trivial payments
oﬀ network. However, the marginal participant may prefer not to invest if he believed he
would incur charges for oﬀ-network receipts from non-investing participants. Similarly, if
2ϕ < γ < ϕ + ¯ δ, the central planner would prefer no participants invest since the total cost
of doing so is greater than the total cost of sending all now trivial payments oﬀ network.
However, the marginal participant may prefer to invest if he believed he would incur charges
for on-network receipts from investing participants.
16vestors to keep payments oﬀ-network. In this case, the main concern is that
the low-investment equilibrium occurs.
It follows directly from propositions 2 and 3 that if 2[θ¯ δ + (1 − θ)ϕ] <
γ ≤ 2θ¯ δ + (1 − θ)(ϕ + ¯ δ) then a coordinator can implement the equilibrium
with investment while the planner would choose not to. The incentive for
the coordinator to do so will depend on whether it is independent of the
participants or is owned by them.
In the latter case, investment will not be undertaken by the coordinator
whenever γ > 2[θ¯ δ + (1 − θ)ϕ]. Indeed, in that case the cost of investing
in the technology is greater than the amount saved by using the technology.
Realizing this, participants will prevent the coordinator from operating. This
should be unsurprising since, when the participants control the coordinator,
their objective function becomes the same as that of the planner. Of course,
in principle this does not eliminate the possibility that the high investment
equilibrium might arise nonetheless through uncoordinated individual deci-
sions. However introspection suggests it would be surprising if, after partici-
pants jointly decide to prevent the coordinator from implementing the high-
investment equilibrium, they would each believe other network participants
would independently invest in the technology.
If the coordinator is independent of the participants, these owners cannot
simply prevent the coordinator from operating.14 Indeed, since coordinator
revenue is limited to on-network payments, an independent operator prefers to
set prices to drive all payment activity on network regardless of the value of γ.
It is thus interesting to ask if it might be possible to constrain the coordinator’s
activity when the high-investment equilibrium is not socially eﬃcient. A set
of constraints that assures the coordinator cannot raise revenue in excess of
14The coordinator always makes zero proﬁts since we have assumed constant returns to
scale in the investment technology. Hence, strictly speaking, the coordinator is indiﬀerent
between investing or not. However, as will be discussed below, if there is any cost saving to
coordinated investment, the coordinator has a strict preference for investing.
172[θ¯ δ + (1 − θ)ϕ] is suﬃcient to prevent the coordinator from operating when
the high-investment equilibrium is sub-optimal.
To illustrate this point, let us assume the coordinator is allowed to choose
qs and qr freely, but that a constraint can be imposed on any ﬁxed cost. The
coordinator can charge at most qs = ϕ if participants are to send their pay-
ments over the network. If participants are allowed to ‘unhook’ the technology,
the coordinator can charge no more than qr = ¯ δ for payments received. Let ˜ f
denote the maximum ﬁxed price that may be charged in order to implement
only socially eﬃcient high-investment equilibria. In this case
˜ f + ϕ + ¯ δ ≤ 2[θ¯ δ + (1 − θ)ϕ] (15)
which implies
˜ f ≤ (2θ − 1)[¯ δ − ϕ]. (16)
Restricting the ﬁnal allocation to be socially eﬃcient requires a limit on the
ﬁxed price proportional to the spread between the hook-up cost and the cost
of trivial oﬀ-network payments. When θ ≥ 0.5, the coordinator should not be
allowed to charge a ﬁxed price greater than this bound. In this case, there
are relatively many urgent payments to be made and the ﬁxed-price limit is
increasing in hook-up cost and the cost of trivial oﬀ-network payments. When
θ < 0.5, the coordinator should be prohibited from charging a ﬁxed price and
should be charged a ﬁxed tax per participant equal to the absolute value of
the bound. In this case, there are relatively few urgent payments to be made
and the ﬁxed tax is increasing in hook-up cost and decreasing in the cost of
trivial oﬀ-network payments. The proceeds from the tax can be returned to
participants. These constraints guarantee the coordinator will not operate in
18the region of the parameter space where the high-investment equilibrium is
suboptimal.
3.4 Discussion: cost duplication and property rights
The previous sections have shown that a multiplicity of equilibria in the par-
ticipant investment decision creates a valuable opportunity for coordination.
The analysis focused on a coordinating agent investing in a constant-returns-
to-scale network-speciﬁc technology. Our objective here has been to show that
even absent true cost savings to coordinating investment, doing so is suﬃcient
to overcome the network problem demonstrated in Section (3.1). A more
realistic assumption may be that at least some costs incurred through decen-
tralized investment in the network-speciﬁc technology are duplicative. In such
an event, positive proﬁts will accrue to the coordinator that may be used to
oﬀset contracting and enforcement costs.
For example, consider a case in which the investment represents a potential
innovation in the participant cost of hooking up to the network. Assuming zero
marginal cost of duplication of the innovation, decentralized investors face
two opportunities: one to overcome the coordination problem speciﬁed above,
a second to avoid duplicative innovation. Absent the ability to appropriate
gains associated with application of the innovation, participants may be unable
to justify expenditure on the innovative activity on the basis of their own
small share of the total payments market. A system of patents could be
introduced, however, to award property rights to application of the innovation.
The single innovator would then license the network-speciﬁc technology to
participants. Positive proﬁts attributable to avoiding duplicative expenditure
on the innovation could then be used to oﬀset the cost of monitoring and
enforcing the property rights.
To conclude this section, we note that a network eﬀect does not appear
19to pose a signiﬁcant barrier to innovation when network access is priced at
marginal cost. A coordinator is able to implement the high-investment equi-
librium from the multiplicity attributable to the network eﬀect. Indeed, the
main concern seems to be how to prevent overinvestment from occurring. As
we will see below, it is the ability of the network owner to commit to prices
that allow the high-investment equilibrium to be implemented.
4 The no-commitment case
This section considers the case where the network operator is unable to commit
to prices. Instead, the network chooses prices ps for payments sent and pr for
payments received on-network after network participants have made their
investment decisions. Due to this inability to commit, the equilibrium with
high investment generally does not exist, even when coordination is possible.
In contrast to the previous section, this result reﬂects a hold-up problem
that cannot be as easily resolved as was the network eﬀect.15 Once the invest-
ment in the technology has been made, the ﬁxed cost is sunk and the network
owner will charge participants as much as possible.16 Anticipating this, par-
ticipants will prefer not to invest in the technology because they know they
will be unable to recover the ﬁxed cost of the investment. When the network
owner cannot commit to prices, the only case in which the high-investment
equilibrium can be implemented is where it is possible for the investment co-
ordinator to warranty participants from all ﬁxed costs associated with usage
of the network speciﬁc technology.
Even if only variable costs can be charged, the network operator may pre-
vent the high-investment equilibrium if demand for network payments is suf-
15Grout (1984), Hart (1995), among others, have shown that speciﬁc investment will not
be undertaken at the optimal level if contracts are incomplete.
16This result assumes it is not possible for the coordinator to charge only a variable cost.
For example, a participant that is not paying ﬁxed fees to a coordinator will still incur
one-time costs of setting up and learning a new system.
20ﬁciently inelastic. In this case, monopoly proﬁts from a high margin on the
low volume of urgent payments dominate proﬁts from a low margin on the
high volume of both urgent and trivial payments. This eﬀect is not directly
related to the hold-up problem described above but is instead the standard
ineﬃciency associated with monopoly pricing.
4.1 Decentralized investment
Consider the case of decentralized investment in a technology speciﬁc to a
network. Recall from equation (6) that multiple equilibria exist in the event
that γ falls in the range 2θ¯ δ + (1 − θ)ϕ ≤ γ ≤ 2θ¯ δ + (1 − θ)(ϕ + ¯ δ). In this
case, we prove the following proposition
Proposition 4 If the network cannot commit to usage fees and investment is
decentralized, the high-investment equilibrium does not exist.
Proof. To establish a contradiction, assume the high-investment equilibrium
does exist so that participants have sunk investment γ. The network operator
can set ps = 0 and pr > 0. Participants will send all payments on-network
since their only alternative to doing so would result in a marginal cost of
ϕ > ps = 0. If the network operator sets pr > R, participants make negative
proﬁts and choose to exit the market. However, since the cost of investing
in the technology is sunk, the network operator can set pr = R. Participants
anticipate the optimal monopoly price of pr = R and therefore expect to make
proﬁts of −γ < 0 following their investment in the network-speciﬁc technology.
Consequently, participants prefer not to invest.
In the previous section, when investment in the technology was done through
the coordinator, we had to take into account the fact that participants may
have the ability to ‘unplug’ the technology when receiving payments. In this
section this is not an issue since the price pr is charged for usage of the net-
21work and not usage of the technology. Implicitly, we assume not accepting
payments through the network is equivalent to exiting the market.
4.2 Coordinated investment
Assume it is not possible for participants to incur only a variable cost for use
of the technology. For example, there may be a ﬁxed cost required of the par-
ticipants to learn the technology as discussed in footnote 16. Or, as discussed
in footnote 12, perhaps high variable prices would leave participants with an
ex-post incentive to unplug the technology to avoid paying the technology us-
age fee for on-network receipts. We show that in this case the equilibrium with
high investment only exists when network participants receive a subsidy for
ﬁxed costs associated with use of the network-speciﬁc technology. And even in
this case, the network operator may prevent the high-investment equilibrium
if demand for network transmission is suﬃciently inelastic.
Assume, without loss of generality, that an independent coordinator charges
participants a ﬁxed cost f ∈ (0,γ] as well as variable costs qs ≥ 0 and qr ≥ 0
high enough to recover its total costs.
Proposition 5 When the coordinator charges some ﬁxed cost and participants
do not control the network operator then only the no-investment equilibrium
exists.
Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose that all participants acquire the
technology through a coordinator. If the network operator chooses ps = 0, it
can charge each participant up to pr = R−qr −qs. At that price, participants
make no margin on their payment activity. If the network operator were to
charge more, participants would make a negative margin on payments and
would choose to exit the market. Since they make no margin, participants are
unable to recover the ﬁxed cost, f, which is sunk. Since they anticipate such
22monopoly pricing behavior, participants prefer not to invest in the technology.
The proof of proposition 5 does not go through whenever a credible claim
can be made to subsidize all participant ﬁxed costs. Indeed, since there are
no ﬁxed costs to cover in this case, participants are willing to invest in the
technology as long as they make at least zero proﬁt.17
Proposition 6 When participants do not control the network operator, the
full-investment equilibrium exists if participants can avoid all ﬁxed costs.
Proof. By way of contradiction, assume participants have not acquired the
technology. Assuming ps = 0 and pr unrestricted, the network operator can
charge pr ≤ R − qs − qr. Hence the high-investment equilibrium exists and is
unique.
4.2.1 Monopoly pricing for network usage when the price for pay-
ments received is limited and demand is suﬃciently inelastic
Proposition 6 shows that the high-investment equilibrium exists if use of the
technology requires only variable costs. For example, a monopolist network
owner may be able to coordinate investment and provide a subsidy to partici-
pants to defray ﬁxed costs of technology adoption. Even in this case, however,
we show that if the network owner is limited in how much it can charge on pay-
17The precise way in which ﬁxed-cost subsidization could be achieved is beyond the scope
of this analysis. However, realistic assumptions in this regard suggest it may be diﬃcult to
avoid hold-up, even if full-investment obtains in the present formalization. For example, the
network owner could provide the ﬁxed-cost subsidy. However, if ﬁxed costs varied across
participants, all participants would have an incentive to misrepresent themselves as a high-
cost type. Alternatively, the coordinator could provide the subsidy. However, this would
simply shift the hold-up to the coordinator-participant relationship if the coordinator could
not commit to variable fees qs and qr.
23ments received,18 there are parameter values for which only the no-investment
equilibrium exists. Speciﬁcally, this result depends on the elasticity of demand
for network access.
Proposition 7 Assume the monopoly must set pr = ¯ p. If θ¯ ϕ > ϕ and if ¯ p
is suﬃciently small the high-investment equilibrium cannot be implemented in
the region of the parameter space where multiple equilibria occur.
Proof. By way of contradiction, assume without loss of generality that the
coordinator charges qr > 0 and qs = 0. Also assume all participants have
invested in the technology through the coordinator. Let ¯ p = 0. Whether
participants make all their payments or only urgent payments over the network
depends on the price ps chosen by the monopoly. If ps ≤ ϕ, then all payments
are made over the network. The monopoly’s proﬁt is maximized and equal to
ϕ when ps = ϕ. If ϕ < ps ≤ ¯ ϕ, then only urgent payments are made over the
network. In that case, the monopoly’s proﬁt is maximized and equal to θ¯ ϕ
when ps = ¯ ϕ. If the monopoly chooses ps > ¯ ϕ, no payment is made on the
network and the monopoly makes zero proﬁts.
If θ¯ ϕ ≥ ϕ, it is optimal for the monopoly to charge a price so high that
only urgent payments are sent through the network. Since such payments
are made through the network anyway, a coordinator cannot improve upon
decentralized investment. Participants choose to invest in the technology only
if γ ≤ 2θ¯ δ, which is outside of the region in which multiple equilibria occur.
By continuity, the proof continues to hold for small values of ¯ p > 0.
18This case is particularly interesting in light of policy debates over whether it is ‘fair’
to be charged for transactions one did not initiate. For example, interchange fees may be
interpreted as the price charged merchant (participants) by the credit card (network) to
receive payment from a card holder (participant.) The proof to proposition 7 shows that if
demand for on-network payments is suﬃciently inelastic then limiting the price for payments
received can avoid investment in the network-speciﬁc technology, even when such investment
would be socially optimal.
24The intuition for this result is that the monopolist network owner may
earn higher proﬁts by charging a high price for urgent payments alone than
by charging a lower price on all payments. This depends on the elasticity
of demand for network access. In our simple model, the demand curve only
has two points: either all payments go through the network or only urgent
payments do. The demand curve is relatively inelastic if the diﬀerence between
the price at which all payments are made through the network and the price at
which only urgent payments are made through the network is relatively large.
Hence, if the demand curve is suﬃciently inelastic, the monopolist prefers to
set a high price and restrict quantity.







Figure 2 illustrates this point for the particular set of prices considered in
the proof. In this case, the elasticity of demand for sending payments over
25the network is (1−θ
1+θ)(
ϕ+¯ ϕ
ϕ−¯ ϕ). The demand curve is inelastic if this expression
is smaller than -1. This is the case if θ¯ ϕ > ϕ, which is true if and only if
θ(¯ ϕ−ϕ) > (1−θ)ϕ. That is, the optimal monopoly price will restrict network
usage if the premium that can be charged on urgent payments exceeds the
total revenue foregone on trivial payments. Thus, intuition derived from this
stylized model extends to more realistic cases where the demand curve is not
restricted to be two points.
4.3 Comparison with the planner’s allocation
Proposition 4 states that for all values of γ > 0, the decentralized high-
investment equilibrium cannot occur. Hence, if 0 < γ ≤ 2[θ¯ δ + (1 − θ)ϕ] the
equilibrium allocation is suboptimal. Moreover, note that the high-investment
allocation cannot occur even when it would be individually rational for par-
ticipants to invest regardless of beliefs about other participants, i.e. when
0 < γ < 2θ¯ δ + (1 − θ)ϕ. Recall with commitment, the high-investment equi-
librium is unique for these parameter values.
More interestingly in absence of commitment, opportunities for coordina-
tion are limited because coordination alone cannot solve the underinvestment
problem. In this case, proposition 5 shows that any measure of ﬁxed costs will
avoid the high-investment equilibrium, even for parameter values for which
the planner would choose to invest.
If it is possible for the coordinator to charge only a variable cost then
the socially optimal level of investment will be implemented if the demand
curve is suﬃciently elastic. If γ < 2[θδ + (1 − θ)ϕ] then the coordinator will
implement the high-investment equilibrium which is optimal. If γ > 2[θ¯ δ +
(1 − θ)ϕ] then the monopoly network owner will avoid high investment, even
if the coordinator would prefer it. In this case, the network owner could price
payments sent suﬃciently high to drive trivial payments oﬀ network. The
monopolist network owner would thereby maximize the value it can extract
26through the ’receiver pays’ feature of this two-sided market.
If the price pr that can be charged is restricted, then the monopolist might
choose not to subsidize the ﬁxed cost of the technology. If this is the case,
there will be underinvestment whenever γ < 2[θδ + (1 − θ)ϕ].
This problem illustrates an interesting feature of this two-sided market.
If pr is unrestricted, the monopolist does not create the usual ineﬃciency
of one-sided markets by charging a high price ps. Since participants cannot
aﬀect the cost of payments received, the monopolist can implement the eﬃcient
allocation even while it maximizes its own surplus. Hence, an interesting policy
implication from Proposition 7 is that the network owners should be allowed
to charge for payments received. The charge for payments made through the
network should be kept to a minimum.19
5 Discussion
This paper suggests inability to commit to prices for network usage can lead
to ineﬃciently low investment in network-speciﬁc technologies. Mechanisms
that can achieve commitment therefore present a proﬁtable opportunity. Con-
sequently, we expect networks will adopt governance structures that mitigate
this commitment problem. Moreover, these governance arrangements will also
be suﬃcient to solve the problem arising from the network eﬀect.
Several cases from the payments industry are illustrative. The payments
function of revolving-credit and charge card programs is a system of accounts
that allows merchant and consumer patrons to exchange goods and services
without carrying cash. Absent a cost-eﬀective retail interface (e.g. the swipe
19If there were congestions costs on the network, the charge for payments sent would
be strictly positive. However, that would not change the logic of the argument that they
should be kept to a minimum compatible with preventing excess usage of the network.
Note, for example, that on payment systems such as Fedwire and FedACH a fee is charged
to recipients as well as to senders. For Fedwire, the amount of the fee is the same for both.
For FedACH, the fee per item can be greater for the recipient that for the originator.
27card, expenditure reports valued by consumers and merchants, consumer pro-
motions valued by merchants,) use of the system would be relatively costly for
patrons. Banks acquiring merchants and/or issuing cards to consumers would
have some incentive to invest in development of such a cost-eﬀective retail
interface. However, as suggested by the model, a network eﬀect may avoid
investment – the incentive to invest in such an innovation would depend on
the investment decisions of other acquiring and/or issuing banks. Also as sug-
gested by the model, if the network eﬀect were the only cause of sub-optimal
investment, an independent coordinator could invest on behalf of merchant-
acquiring and card-issuing banks in order to implement the high-investment
equilibrium. Without commitment, however, even a coordinator cannot pre-
vent such investment being held up.
Indeed, the historical evidence suggest these factors were in play during
the earliest stages of VISA. The brand was created in 1970 when Bank of
America decided to transfer ownership of the Bank Americard program to li-
censed issuers of the card. Apart from the joint ownership of VISA’s assets,
a key aspect of this organizational structure is that it called for centraliza-
tion of functions that beneﬁted all members jointly.20 From the perspective
of our model, what is most interesting is the consolidation of research and
development (R&D) -type expenditures. This can be interpreted as an eﬀort
to overcome the network eﬀect by introducing a network-owned coordinator in
charge of making investments on behalf of participants. If the network eﬀect
had been the main barrier to innovation, centralizing R&D should have been
enough and there would be no obvious reason for Bank of America to transfer
ownership of the network to its participants. Indeed, given the value of VISA
20Chutkow (2001.) Also, Evans and Schmalensee (2005, p. 6) observe that payments
associations of ﬁnancial institutions allow cooperation in eﬃciency-generating areas such as
“design and operation of the vast computer networks that now enable transactions around
the world to be completed in just a few seconds, as well as advertising an some aspects of
product development.”
28today, this could have been a major mistake.
Taking into account the hold-up problem brought about by the lack of
commitment suggests instead that joint ownership of network assets was key to
the development of VISA. Consider a hypothetical institution that would have
been a participant of the network but not a joint owner. Such an institution
would realize that the beneﬁts from any network-speciﬁc investment it made
could be extracted by the network. This would reduce incentives to invest.
To promote innovation, the network owner would have to ﬁnd a way to
credibly commit not to expropriate the beneﬁts from investment. One way
to achieve this would be for the network to be jointly owned by potentially-
innovating participants. Hence, National Bank Americard Incorporated, jointly
owned by card-issuing banks, is an illustration of a governance structure that
emerges for its superior capability to achieve commitment.
The history of MasterCard is also illustrative. MasterCard evolved from a
group of east coast banks that were issuing paper that could be used as cash in
local stores. In 1951, the Franklin Bank of New York issued the ﬁrst conven-
tional credit card. Over time, a system of banks emerged that would accept
the card as payment with merchants that they had chosen to work with. In
1966, one of these groups formalized their relationship as the Interbank Card
Association, which would later become MasterCard International.21 Unlike
the VISA story, MasterCard began as an organization that was jointly owned
by card-issuing and merchant-acquiring banks. Consistent with the implica-
tions of our model, it is not surprising that VISA would evolve toward an
organizational form ﬁrst established by MasterCard.
The story of Amex suggests integrated ownership is an alternative gov-
ernance mechanism that can achieve commitment. American Express was
formed in 1850 from the merger of Wells and Co. and Butterﬁeld, Wasson and
Co., two prominent shipping ﬁrms linking the eastern seaboard to Buﬀalo,
21MasterCard International. Mandell (1990.)
29New York and the growing cities in the midwest.22 As rail transport replaced
stage coach following completion of the Transcontinential Rail Road in 1869,
American Express transformed itself from a from a freight shipper to a freight
forwarding ﬁrm.23 The ﬁrm used its geographically dispersed ﬁeld oﬃces to
diversify into ﬁnancial and travel services in response to its waning dominance
of the freight industry.
In 1952, the earliest days of the charge card industry, American Express
had 63 domestic and 209 foreign ﬁeld oﬃces.24 Eyeing the popularity of the
Diners’ Club Card, American Express launched a charge card in 1958. Between
the goodwill the company had generated through its ﬁnancial and travel ser-
vices operations and a strategic alliance with the American Hotel Association,
American Express had over 250,000 cards issued when it ﬁnally launched the
product.25 Although it would take a number of years for the card to turn a
proﬁt, the American Express card would become one of the company’s deﬁn-
ing and most proﬁtable ventures. The American Express card weathered early
losses without drastic changes to its form of governance. This is consistent
with the model insofar as American Express’ dispersed network of ﬁeld oﬃces
that promoted the card in its earliest days were integrated under the same
governing structure as the card division.
A ﬁnal application for our model is the case of Fedwire. Fedwire is a
system that allows real-time transfer of funds between bank patrons. Biehl,
McAndrews, and Stefanadis (2002) document a signiﬁcant diﬀerential between
wholesale and retail prices for Fedwire transfers. Speciﬁcally, the authors re-
port wholesale prices averaging about 25 cents while retail prices range up to
100 times that amount. A cost accounting of Fedwire retail transactions sug-




25Grossman (1987) p. 284.
30Absent automation of the wire-transfer process, each retail transaction entails
a relatively costly process in which several employees must record and verify in-
formation necessary to transfer the requested balance across internal accounts
and, ultimately, out of the bank. But such a ﬁnding begs the question, why
don’t banks invest in automation of the retail Fedwire transaction? One possi-
bility is a network problem. However, our model suggests that a coordinating
agent could implement the high-investment equilibrium where commitment to
network usage fees is feasible. Consequently, our model suggests that the key
problem is a perceived inability for the Federal Reserve to commit to future
prices for Fedwire transactions.
In principle, prices for Fedwire are not determined by a proﬁt-maximizing
entity. The Federal Reserve is required to charge only enough to recover its
cost. However, investment could be held up if Fedwire users do not believe
that the Federal Reserve can credibly commit to cost-recovering prices. For
example, ‘cost recovery’ is not credible absent complete transparency. This
may be diﬃcult to achieve where costs are shared and therefore subject to
a range of possible allocation schemes. Consequently, the results presented
in this paper suggest underutilization of Fedwire assets is a result of hold-up
rather than a network eﬀect. This ﬁnding may be of interest to policymakers
concerned with increasing utilization of Fedwire network assets.
Several solutions to the commitment problem are possible. As has been
noted above, it might be possible to encourage innovation by subsidizing any
ﬁxed cost associated with such investment. However, the Federal Reserve
might not be authorized to do such a thing. An alternative would be for the
Federal Reserve to do the innovation itself. While this would solve the problem
in principle, it is legitimate to ask whether this kind of R&D activity is best
undertaken by the Federal Reserve. Yet another possible solution would be
to transfer ownership of Fedwire assets to its users, as in the case of VISA.
This solution proved very eﬀective for VISA, but the Federal Reserve might
31view retaining ownership of Fedwire as important for its ability to fulﬁll some
aspect of its mission. Finally, if lack of transparency is an important factor in
the hold up of Fedwire-speciﬁc investment, it might be possible to make the
way the pricing of Fedwire is determined more transparent. If Fedwire users
feel the Federal Reserve can credibly commit not to expropriate the value of
their investment, the users or a third-party coordinator would have greater
incentives to innovate.
Studies of networks typically focus on network externalities, or the extent
to which social gains may be derived from coordinated usage. Though less con-
sidered in the literature, investment speciﬁcity is also a feature representative
of many network environments. This paper presents a model that combines a
network eﬀect with a hold-up problem to illustrate the relationship between
these phenomena. The analysis suggests that, if a network can commit to us-
age fees, a number of pricing schemes would allow a coordinator to implement
high investment in network-speciﬁc technology. If the network is unable to
commit, however, the expectation of optimal pricing for network access will
hold-up investment associated with any measure of ﬁxed costs.
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